Abstract. Suppose that T * is an ω 1 -Aronszajn tree with no stationary antichain. We introduce a forcing axiom PFA(T * ) for proper forcings which preserve these properties of T * . We prove that PFA(T * ) implies many of the strong consequences of PFA, such as the failure of very weak club guessing, that all of the cardinal characteristics of the continuum are greater than ω 1 , and the P -ideal dichotomy. On the other hand, PFA(T * ) implies some of the consequences of diamond principles, such as the existence of Knaster forcings which are not stationarily Knaster.
In one of the earliest applications of the method of forcing in set theory, Solovay and Tennenbaum [8] proved the consistency of Suslin's hypothesis, which is the statement that there does not exist an ω 1 -Suslin tree. Baumgartner, Malitz, and Reinhardt [3] improved this by showing that MA ω1 implies that every ω 1 -Aronszajn tree is special, a statement which implies Suslin's hypothesis. Shelah [7, Chapter IX] proved that Suslin's hypothesis does not imply that all ω 1 -Aronszajn trees are special by constructing a model in which there are no ω 1 -Suslin trees but there exists a non-special Aronszajn tree. In Shelah's model, the non-special Aronszajn tree satisfies that there are stationarily many levels on which the tree is special, and stationary many levels on which there is no stationary antichain (recall that an antichain of a tree is stationary if the set of heights of its nodes forms a stationary set). Schlindwein [6] improved this result by constructing a model in which there are no ω 1 -Suslin trees but there exists an ω 1 -Aronszajn tree which has no stationary antichain.
In this paper we expand on these results by developing a forcing axiom for proper forcings which preserve a particular ω 1 -Aronszajn tree with no stationary antichain. Let T * denote an ω 1 -Aronszajn tree with no stationary antichain. We let PFA(T * ) be the statement that for any proper forcing poset P which forces that T * is still an ω 1 -Aronszajn tree with no stationary antichain, for any sequence D α : α < ω 1 of dense subsets of P, there exists a filter G such that G ∩ D α = ∅ for all α < ω 1 . This forcing axiom is similar in spirit to the previously studied forcing axiom PFA(S) introduced by Todorcevic [10] , which is a version of PFA but restricted to forcings which preserve the Suslinness of a particular coherent ω 1 -Suslin tree. These forcing axioms are useful for understanding the relationship between consequences of PFA, properties of ω 1 -trees, and the ω 1 -chain condition of forcing posets.
The consistency of PFA(T * ) is established from a supercompact cardinal using forcing iteration preservation theorems of Shelah [7] and Schlindwein [6] . We then derive a variety of consequences of PFA(T * ). These consequences include Suslin's hypothesis, the failure of very weak club guessing, that all of the standard cardinal characteristic of the continuum are greater than ω 1 , and the P -ideal dichotomy. We also prove that under PFA(T * ), the forcing poset consisting of finite antichains of T * ordered by reverse inclusion is Knaster but not stationarily Knaster, which is in contrast to MA ω1 which implies that all Knaster forcings are stationarily Knaster. The existence of a Knaster forcing which is not stationarily Knaster is also shown to follow from ♦ * . Thus, our forcing axiom PFA(T * ) implies a significant portion of the consequences of PFA while also having consequences in common with diamond principles.
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Forcings which preserve T *
In this section, we develop the basic ideas concerning forcing posets which preserve a non-special Aronszajn tree. Definition 1.1. Let T be a tree with height ω 1 . A set A ⊆ T is said to be a stationary antichain if A is an antichain of T and the set {ht T * (x) : x ∈ A} is a stationary subset of ω 1 .
Observe that any ω 1 -Suslin tree has no uncountable antichain, and hence no stationary antichain, but any special ω 1 -Aronszajn tree has a stationary antichain. In fact, if an ω 1 -tree has a special subtree whose nodes meet stationarily many levels, then by a pushing down argument it has a stationary antichain.
For the remainder of the paper, whenever we mention T * we will assume that T * is an ω 1 -Aronszajn tree with no stationary antichain.
Definition 1.2.
A forcing poset P is said to be T * -preserving if P forces that T * is an ω 1 -Aronszajn tree with no stationary antichain.
Let T be an ω 1 -tree. We define a relation < − T by letting x < − T y if ht T (x) < ht T (y) and x < T y. Observe that x < − T y implies that x and y are not comparable in T . Definition 1.3. Let N be a countable set such that δ := N ∩ ω 1 is an ordinal. A node x ∈ T δ is said to be (N, T )-generic if for any set A ⊆ T which is a member of N and any relation R ∈ {< T , < Consider x ∈ T * δ . Let G be a generic filter on P which contains q, and we claim that x is (N [G], T * )-generic. So N [G] is an elementary substructure of H(θ)
which contains T * . Since q is (N, P)-generic, N [G] ∩ ω 1 = N ∩ ω 1 = δ. Thus, x ∈ T * N [G]∩ω1 . As P is T * -preserving, in V [G] we have that T * is still an ω 1 -Aronszajn tree with no stationary antichain. So we can apply Lemma 1.5 in V [G] to conclude that x is (N [G], T * )-generic.
While the converse of Lemma 1.8 is not true in general, we will show below that if P is T * -proper, then there is a P-nameQ for a forcing poset such that P * Q is proper and T * -preserving. The next lemma appears in [6] . Lemma 1.9. If P is T * -proper, then P forces that T * is an ω 1 -Aronszajn tree.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that some condition p forces thatȦ is a cofinal branch of T * . Fix a large enough regular cardinal θ with T * , P, andȦ in H(θ). By Lemma 1.5 and the definition of T * -proper, there exist N and q such that: (1) N is a countable elementary substructure of (H(θ), ∈, T * , P, p,Ȧ); (2) q ≤ p is (N, P, T * )-generic; (3) every member of T * N ∩ω1 is (N, T * )-generic. Let δ := N ∩ ω 1 .
Fix r ≤ q and x ∈ T * δ such that r forces that x ∈Ȧ. Since q is (N, P, T * )-generic and x is (N, T * )-generic, q forces that x is (N [Ġ P ], T * )-generic. Let G be a generic filter which contains r and let A :
By the definition of < − T * , y is not below x in T * , and hence is incomparable with x. So x and y are both in A but are incomparable in T * , which contradicts that A is a chain.
Observe that we only used the portion of the definitions involving the relation < − T * for the above result. Throughout the paper, we will prove that a multitude of forcing posets are T * -proper. As a warm-up and because we will need it in the next section, let us prove that every ω 1 -closed forcing is T * -proper. In fact, this will be a special case of something more general. Definition 1.10. A forcing poset P is ω 1 -generically closed if for all large enough regular cardinals θ, there are club many N ∈ P ω1 (H(θ)) such that whenever p n : n < ω is a descending sequence of conditions in N ∩ P which meets every dense open subset of P in N , then this sequence has a lower bound.
A sequence as described in Definition 1.10 will be called an (N, P)-generic sequence. Observe that countably closed forcings are ω 1 -generically closed.
Proof. Fix a large enough regular cardinal θ and a countable elementary substructure N of H(θ) which contains P and T * and satisfies that every descending (N, P)-generic sequence has a lower bound. Let δ := N ∩ ω 1 . Let x n : n < ω , Ȧ n : n < ω , and D n : n < ω enumerate all of the nodes in T Consider p ∈ N ∩ P. We define by induction a descending sequence of conditions p n : n < ω in N ∩ P as follows. Let p 0 := p. Assume that n < ω and p n is defined. Let f (n) = (m, k, j). If j = 0, fix p n+1 ≤ p n in N ∩ D m (in this case, we ignore k). Suppose that j = 0. If j = 1, let R be the relation < T * , and if j = 2, let R be the relation < − T * . Let B n denote the set of z ∈ T * such that some extension of p n forces that z ∈Ȧ k . Then B n ∈ N by elementarity. If x m / ∈ B n , then let p n+1 := p n . Suppose that x m ∈ B n . Since x m is (N, T * )-generic, there exists y R x m such that y ∈ B n . Then y ∈ N . By the definition of B n and elementarity, we can fix p n+1 ≤ p n in N ∩ P which forces that y ∈Ȧ k .
This completes the definition of p n : n < ω . Observe that this sequence is (N, P)-generic. So we can find q ∈ P such that q ≤ p n for all n < ω. In particular, q ≤ p. Clearly, q is (N, P)-generic. To see that it is (N, P, T * )-generic, let x ∈ T * δ , A ∈ N a P-name for a subset of T * , and R ∈ {< T * , < − T * }. Suppose that r ≤ q and r forces that x ∈Ȧ.
Fix m and k such that x = x m andȦ =Ȧ k . Let j := 1 if R equals < T * and j := 2 if R equals < − T * . Fix n such that f (n) = (m, k, j). Now r ≤ p n and r forces that x m ∈Ȧ k . So r witnesses that x m ∈ B n . By construction, there exists y R x m such that p n+1 forces that y ∈Ȧ k . Since r ≤ p n+1 , r forces that y ∈Ȧ. 
A forcing axiom for T *
We now introduce and prove the consistency of a forcing axiom for T * . The following well-known forcing poset will be used in a number of different contexts throughout the paper, beginning in this section. (
and ordered by g ≤ f if f ⊆ g.
It is not difficult to show that if A is stationary, then CU(A) preserves ω 1 and forces that the set {dom(f ) : f ∈Ġ CU(A) } is a club subset of A. The next result states that the property of being T * -proper is satisfied by certain countable support forcing iterations. Theorem 2.2. Let T * be an ω 1 -Aronszajn tree with no stationary antichain. Let
be a countable support forcing iteration such that for all γ < α, P γ forces either:
This theorem was proven in [6, Theorem 21] under the assumption that T * is an ω 1 -Suslin tree. However, exactly the same proof works assuming instead that T * is an ω 1 -Aronszajn tree with no stationary antichain. In fact, the only place in the proof of [6, Theorem 21] where the Suslin property of the tree is used is in case 2 of the successor case, which uses [6, Lemma 8] . This lemma has the same conclusion as Lemma 1.5 above, but assumes instead that the tree is Suslin. Thus, the proof of Theorem 2.2 is exactly the same as the proof of [6, Theorem 21] , except replacing its application of [6, Lemma 8] by our Lemma 1.5. Proposition 2.3. Let P be a T * -proper forcing poset. Then there exists a P-namė Q for a forcing poset such that P * Q is proper and T * -preserving.
Proof. For simplicity, assume first that there exists a regular cardinal κ such that P * Add(ω 1 ) forces that κ = ω 2 . We will handle the case in which there does not at the end. Since Add(ω 1 ) forces CH, we have that in any generic extension by P * Add(ω 1 ), CH holds and κ = ω 2 .
We define a forcing iteration P i ,Q j : i ≤ κ, j < κ as follows. The first forcing in the iteration is P, and the second forcing is Add(ω 1 ). Assume that 2 ≤ α < κ and P α is defined. We consider a P α -nameİ α for an antichain of T * , and letQ α be a P α -name for the forcing poset CU(ω 1 \Ṡ α ), whereṠ α is a P α -name for the set {ht T * (z) : z ∈İ α }. Observe that after forcing withQ α ,İ α is not a stationary antichain. At limit stages δ ≤ κ, we define P δ by taking the limit with countable support.
This completes the definition. Now P is T * -proper, and since Add(ω 1 ) is forced to be ω 1 -closed, it is forced to be T * -proper as well by Corollary 1.12. By Theorem 2.2, it follows that P κ is T * -proper. Hence, P κ preserves ω 1 , and by Lemma 1.9, P κ forces that T * is an ω 1 -Aronszajn tree. Now in V P2 , which models CH, standard arguments show that the tail of the iteration is forcing equivalent to a countable support iteration of length ω 2 of the forcings CU(ω 1 \Ṡ α ), which each have size ω 1 . By [7, Lemma 2.4, Chapter VIII], this iteration is ω 2 -c.c. Since κ equals ω 2 in V P2 , it follows that P κ forces that κ = ω 2 . The chain condition also implies that we can arrange by standard bookkeeping that all antichains of T * appearing in V Pκ are handled at some stage. It follows that P κ forces that T * has no stationary antichain. So in V Pκ , T * is an ω 1 -Aronszajn tree with no stationary antichain.
LetQ be a P-name for the tail of the iteration after forcing with P. Then P * Q is forcing equivalent to P κ , which is proper and forces that T * is an ω 1 -Aronszajn tree with no stationary antichain. Thus, P * Q is T * -preserving, completing the proof under our simplifying assumption. Now assume that P * Add(ω 1 ) does not decide the value of ω 2 . Letλ be a P-name for the successor of the cardinal 2 ω in V P . Since Add(ω 1 ) adds a bijection of ω 1 onto 2 ω and has size 2 ω , P * Add(ω 1 ) forces that ω 2 =λ. Let E be a maximal antichain of conditions in P which decide the value ofλ. For each p ∈ E, apply the above to find a (P/p)-nameQ p such that (P/p) * Q p is proper and T * -preserving. Now letQ be a P-name for the forcing poset which is equal toQ p , where p is the unique element inĠ P ∩ E. Then P * Q is as required. 
In practice, we do not have a general way to verify that a proper forcing is T * -preserving. Therefore, the following characterization of PFA(T * ) will be useful. 
Proof. Let P denote the statement which we are claiming to be equivalent to PFA(T * ). Since any proper T * -preserving forcing poset is T * -proper by Lemma 1.8, P obviously implies PFA(T * ). Conversely, assume PFA(T * ). Let P be a T * -proper forcing poset and D α : α < ω 1 a sequence of dense subsets of P. By Proposition 2.3, there exists a P-nameQ such that P * Q is proper and T * -preserving. For each α < ω 1 , let E α be the set of conditions p * q in P * Q such that p ∈ D α . Then easily each E α is dense in P * Q. Applying PFA(T * ), fix a filter The proof is nearly identical to the usual construction of a model of PFA. We iterate with countable support of length κ forcings which are either T * -proper of size less than κ, or of the form CU(ω 1 \ S), where S = {ht T * (z) : z ∈ I} for some antichain I ⊆ T * . We use a Laver function as a bookkeeping mechanism to anticipate all possible T * -proper forcings and all possible antichains of T * in the final model. By Theorem 2.2, such a forcing iteration is T * -proper. Also, standard arguments show that it is κ-c.c., and by Lemma 1.9 and the construction, T * is still an ω 1 -Aronszajn tree with no stationary antichain after forcing with it. Since ω 1 -closed forcings are T * -proper, and in particular the collapse Col(ω 1 , ω 2 ) is T * -proper, the iteration forces that κ equals ω 2 . Now the same elementary embedding argument used in the original proof for PFA works the same in this context to prove PFA(T * ).
Strong properness and club guessing
In this section, we will prove that any strongly proper forcing is T * -proper. It will follow that PFA(T * ) implies the failure of weak club guessing. We then show by a more intricate argument that PFA(T * ) implies the failure of very weak club guessing.
We recall some definitions. Let P be a forcing poset. For a set N , a condition q ∈ P is said to be strongly (N, P)-generic if for any dense subset D of the poset N ∩ P, D is predense below q. This property is equivalent to saying that for all r ≤ q, there is u ∈ N ∩ P such that for all v ≤ u in N ∩ P, r and v are compatible. We say that P is strongly proper if for all large enough regular cardinals θ with P ∈ H(θ), for club many countable N ∈ P ω1 (H(θ)), for all p ∈ N ∩ P, there is q ≤ p which is strongly (N, P)-generic. Proof. Fix a large enough regular cardinal θ. Let N be a countable elementary substructure of (H(θ), ∈, T * , P) such that every member of N ∩ P has a strongly (N, P)-generic extension. Let δ := N ∩ ω 1 . Consider p ∈ N ∩ P. Fix q ≤ p which is strongly (N, P)-generic. Then in particular, q is (N, P)-generic.
We claim that q is (N, P, T * )-generic. Let x ∈ T * δ ,Ȧ ∈ N a P-name for a subset of T * , and R ∈ {< T * , < − T * }. Assume that r ≤ q and r forces that x ∈Ȧ. We will find s ≤ r and y R x such that s forces that y ∈Ȧ.
Since q is strongly (N, P)-generic, we can fix u ∈ N ∩ P such that for all v ≤ u in N ∩ P, r and v are compatible. Define B as the set of z ∈ T * for which there exists a condition below u which forces that z ∈Ȧ. Note that B ∈ N by elementarity. Since u and r are compatible, and any common extension of them forces that x ∈Ȧ, it follows that x ∈ B. As x is (N, T * )-generic, there exists y R x such that y ∈ B. Then y ∈ N . By the definition of B and elementarity, we can find v ≤ u in N ∩ P which forces that y ∈Ȧ. By the choice of u, v and r are compatible. Fix s ≤ v, r. Then s ≤ r and s forces that y ∈Ȧ.
Corollary 3.2. PFA(T * ) implies that for any strongly proper forcing poset P, whenever D α : α < ω 1 is a sequence of dense subsets of P, then there exists a filter
Recall that a ladder system is a sequence L = L α : α ∈ lim(ω 1 ) such that for each α, L α is a cofinal subset of α with order type ω. Let L be such a ladder system. Consider the following club guessing properties of L, which are ordered in decreasing strength:
• for any club
• for any club C ⊆ ω 1 , there exists α ∈ lim(ω 1 ) such that L α ∩ C is infinite. We say that club guessing, weak club guessing, or very weak club guessing holds if there exists a ladder system satisfying (1), (2), or (3) respectively.
It is well-known that PFA implies the failure of very weak club guessing ([2, Theorem 3.6]). We will prove that the same holds under PFA(T * ). We use the forcing poset CU(A) described in Section 2. Proof. Let P := CU(D). Consider any regular cardinal θ such that P ∈ H(θ), and let N be a countable elementary substructure of (H(θ), ∈, P, D).
It easily follows that h ↾ δ ∈ N ∩ P, and for all h 1 ≤ h ↾ δ in N ∩ P, h 1 ∪ h is a condition below h 1 and h. 
Proof. Let P be the forcing poset CU(ω 1 ). Then P is strongly proper, and hence T * -proper. LetĊ be a P-name for the set {dom(f ) : f ∈Ġ P }.
Then P forces thatĊ is a club subset of ω 1 . We claim that P forces that for all α < ω 1 , A α \ lim(Ċ) is infinite. Then a straightforward selection of dense subsets of P will show that the desired conclusion follows from PFA(T * ). Consider f ∈ P and x ⊆ A α finite. We will find g ≤ f and some γ ∈ A α \ x which g forces is not in lim(Ċ). Since x and dom(f ) are finite whereas A α is infinite, fix γ ∈ A α which is not in x or dom(f ). If γ is not a limit ordinal, then f already forces that γ / ∈ lim(Ċ). So assume that γ is a limit ordinal. If there exists ξ ∈ dom(f ) such that ξ < γ ≤ f (ξ), then no condition g ≤ f can have γ in dom(g). Therefore, f forces that γ / ∈Ċ, and hence γ / ∈ lim(Ċ). Otherwise, since γ is a limit ordinal, we can find an ordinal α < γ such that for all
Then g ≤ f and g forces that γ is not inĊ, and hence not in lim(Ċ).
It easily follows from the last proposition that PFA(T * ) implies the failure of weak club guessing. But we can do better. 
, and we will prove that under PFA(T * ), L is not a very weak club guessing sequence. We may assume without loss of generality that for all α ∈ lim(ω 1 ), α \ L α is cofinal in α. For if all ladder systems with this property are not very weak club guessing sequences, then it is easy to argue that the same is true for all ladder systems.
Define P as the forcing poset whose conditions are pairs (f, x) such that f ∈ CU(ω 1 ) and
Assuming that P preserves ω 1 , straightforward arguments prove that P introduces a club C ⊆ ω 1 such that for all α ∈ lim(ω 1 ), C ∩ L α is finite, namely, the club of limit ordinals which belong to the club set {dom(f p ) : p ∈Ġ P }. So assuming that P is T * -proper, a routine selection of dense sets shows that under PFA(T * ), L is not a very weak club guessing sequence.
It remains to prove that P is T * -proper. Fix a regular cardinal θ such that T * and P are members of H(θ). Let X denote the set of countable elementary substructures of (H(θ), ∈, T * , P). Observe that by Lemma 1.5, if M ∈ X , then for all x ∈ T * M∩ω1 , x is (M, T * )-generic. Let N be a countable elementary substructure of (H(θ), ∈, T * , P, X ). Observe that N ∈ X . Let δ := N ∩ ω 1 . Consider p ∈ N ∩ P. Define q by f q := f p ∪ {(δ, δ)} and x q := x p . Then q is a condition and q ≤ p. We claim that q is (N, P, T * )-generic. So let D ∈ N be a dense open subset of P, x ∈ T * δ ,Ȧ ∈ N a P-name for a subset of T * , and R ∈ {< T * , < − T * }. Let r ≤ q. By extending further if necessary, we may assume without loss of generality that r ∈ D and r decides whether or not x ∈Ȧ. If r forces that x / ∈Ȧ, then replaceȦ in what follows with the canonical P-name for T * . Hence, without loss of generality, we may assume that r forces that x ∈Ȧ. Observe that since δ ∈ dom(f r ), f r ↾ δ maps into δ, and so is a member of N .
Let B 0 denote the set of z ∈ T * for which there exists some M ∈ X such that D andȦ are members of M , M ∩ ω 1 = ht T * (z), and there exists some condition
, and s forces that z ∈Ȧ. Since all of the parameters mentioned in the definition of B 0 are members of N , B 0 ∈ N by elementarity. Also, x ∈ B 0 as witnessed by N and r.
Since x is (N, T * )-generic, we can fix z < T * x which is in B 0 . Let M and s witness that z ∈ B 0 . Since z ∈ N , we may assume by elementarity that M and s are in N . Let
, and hence is a member of M . (As a point of clarity, we do not claim that r and s are compatible; the argument in what follows is more subtle.)
Fix a limit ordinal ξ < δ 0 which is large enough so that:
This is possible since δ 0 is a limit of limit ordinals and all of the finitely many sets mentioned above are finite subsets of δ 0 .
Define X as the set of β satisfying: (a) β < ξ is a limit ordinal;
Note that X is a finite subset of δ 0 , and hence is a member of M .
For each β ∈ X, choose α β < β large enough so that:
. This is possible since the finitely many sets described in (1) and (2) are finite, and by our assumption about the ladder system, β \ L β is cofinal in β. Observe that since f r ↾ δ = f s ↾ δ 0 and x r ∩ δ = x s ∩ δ 0 , (1) implies that x s ∩ β, dom(f s ) ∩ β, and and ran(f s ) ∩ β are subsets of α β . Also note that by the definition of X, for all γ
by letting x v := x r ∩ δ and
Then also
For β ∈ X, for all γ ∈ dom(f r ) ∩ β, f r (β) < α β , and also if β 1 < β 2 are in X, then β 1 < α β2 . It easily follows that f v ∈ CU(ω 1 ), and hence v ∈ P. So v ∈ M ∩ P. We make two claims about v: (I) v and s are compatible, and (II) any extension of v in M is compatible with r. To see that v and s are compatible, let t :
we have that f v ∪ f s is in CU(ω 1 ). Hence, t is a condition. To see that t ≤ v, we only need to show that for all α ∈ x v , the set dom
To show that t ≤ s, it is enough to show that for all α ∈ x s ,
So let α ∈ x s and let ζ be a limit ordinal in dom(f v ) \ dom(f s ), and we will prove that ζ / ∈ L α . By the definition of v, ζ = α β for some β ∈ X. By property (2) 
This completes the proof that v and s are compatible.
Now we claim that for all w ≤ v in M ∩ P, w and r are compatible.
It remains to show that t ≤ r. It suffices to prove that for all α ∈ x r , dom(
be a limit ordinal, and we will show that ζ / ∈ L α . Note that ζ ∈ dom(f w ) \ dom(f r ). We split the argument into two cases. First, assume that α < δ.
, by the definition of v it must be the case that ζ = α β for some β ∈ X. Since ζ ∈ L α , ζ < α. If α < β, then by (1) in the definition of α β , we have that α < α β = ζ, which is false. By (3) 
This contradiction proves that ζ / ∈ L α in the case that α < δ. Secondly, assume that δ ≤ α. Suppose for a contradiction that ζ ∈ L α . We claim that ζ ∈ X. We know that ζ is a limit ordinal. By the choice of ξ, the fact that ζ ∈ L α implies that ζ < ξ. Let γ ∈ dom(f r ) ∩ δ, and we will prove that it is not the case that γ ≤ ζ ≤ f r (γ). Suppose for a contradiction that γ ≤ ζ ≤ f r (γ). Observe that γ ∈ dom(f v ) by the definition of v. So we have that ζ ∈ dom(f w ) and γ ≤ ζ ≤ f w (γ). Since f w ∈ CU(ω 1 ), this implies that ζ = γ. So ζ ∈ dom(f r ), which contradicts our assumption that ζ is in dom(f w ) \ dom(f r ). Thus, indeed it is not the case that γ ≤ ζ ≤ f r (γ). Now by our current assumption, ζ ∈ L α where α ∈ x r \ δ. This concludes the argument that ζ ∈ X. By the definition of v, f v (α ζ ) = ζ, where α ζ < ζ. Since w ≤ v, f w (α ζ ) = ζ. But ζ ∈ dom(f w ), so as f w ∈ CU(ω 1 ), f w (α ζ ) < ζ, which is a contradiction. This completes the proof that ζ / ∈ L α , and hence that t ≤ w, r.
We can now complete the proof. Let B 1 be the set of nodes y ∈ T * such that for some w ≤ v in D, w forces that y ∈Ȧ. Then B 1 ∈ M by elementarity, and z ∈ B 1 as witnessed by any common lower bound of v and s. Since z is (M, T * )-generic, we can find y R z in B 1 . Note that y R z and z < T * x imply that y R x. As y and B 1 are in M , by elementarity there is w ∈ M ∩ D such that w ≤ v and w forces that y ∈Ȧ. Since every extension of v in M ∩ P is compatible with r, w and r are compatible. Fix t ≤ r, w. Then y R x and t forces that y ∈Ȧ. Also, t ≤ w and w ∈ N ∩ D.
Stationarily Knaster and cardinal characteristics
We will prove in this section that PFA(T * ) implies MA ω1 (σ-centered), and in particular, that all of the standard cardinal characteristics of the continuum are greater than ω 1 . This result will factor through a property of forcing posets called stationarily Knaster. We will also prove that under PFA(T * Proof. Fix a regular cardinal θ such that T * and P are members of H(θ). Let N be a countable elementary substructure of (H(θ), ∈, T * , P). Let δ := N ∩ ω 1 . Since P is ω 1 -c.c., standard arguments show that every condition in P is (N, P)-generic. We will show that every condition in P is (N, P, T * )-generic. Let p ∈ P, x ∈ T * δ ,Ȧ ∈ N a P-name for a subset of T * , and R ∈ {< T * , < − T * }. Assume that q ≤ p and q forces that x ∈Ȧ. We claim that there exists y R x and r ≤ q such that r forces that y ∈Ȧ. Suppose for a contradiction that the claim fails. Then for all y R x, q forces that y / ∈Ȧ. Define B as the set of z ∈ T * such that for some s ∈ P, s forces that z ∈Ȧ, but for all y R z, s forces that y / ∈Ȧ. Then B ∈ N by elementarity, and x ∈ B as witnessed by q. Define S := {ht T * (z) : z ∈ B}, which is in N . Since x ∈ B, δ = ht T * (x) is in S. But δ is a member of every club subset of ω 1 which lies in N , so by elementarity, S is a stationary subset of ω 1 .
For each α ∈ S, fix a node z α ∈ B with height α and a condition s α which witnesses that z α ∈ B. Then s α forces that z α ∈Ȧ, but for all y R z α , s α forces that y / ∈Ȧ. We have that {s α : α ∈ S} ⊆ P and S ⊆ ω 1 is stationary. Since P is stationarily Knaster, we can find a stationary set T ⊆ S such that for all α < β in T , s α and s β are compatible.
Consider α < β in T . Fix r ≤ s α , s β . Then r forces that z α and z β are inȦ. But s β , and hence r, forces that any y R z β is not inȦ. So it must be the case that z α is not R-below z β .
We consider two cases. First, assume that R equals < T * . Then for all α < β in T , z α < T * z β . It follows that z α and z β are incomparable in T * . Thus, {z α : α ∈ T } is an antichain of T * . But the collection of heights of nodes in this antichain is exactly T , which is stationary. So {z α : α ∈ T } is a stationary antichain, which contradicts that T * has no stationary antichain. Secondly, assume that R equals < − T * . Then for all α < β in T , it is not the case that z α < − T * z β . Since ht T * (z α ) = α < β = ht T * (z β ), this means that z α < T * z β .
Thus, {z α : α ∈ T } is an uncountable chain of T * , which contradicts that T * is an ω 1 -Aronszajn tree.
Recall that a forcing poset is σ-centered if it is the union of countably many centered subsets, and is σ-linked if it is the union of countably many linked subsets. Obviously, σ-centered implies σ-linked.
Lemma 4.4. If P is a σ-linked forcing poset, then P is stationarily Knaster.
Proof. Let P = {X n : n < ω}, where each X n is linked. Consider a collection {p i : i ∈ S} of conditions in P, where S ⊆ ω 1 is stationary. If we define a function which maps each α ∈ S to the least n < ω such that p α ∈ X n , then there exists a stationary set T ⊆ S on which this function is constant. Then for some n < ω, {p i : i ∈ T } ⊆ X n , and hence {p i : i ∈ T } is linked.
We can now conclude that PFA(T * ) implies that all of the standard cardinal characteristics of the continuum are larger than ω 1 . Since the pseudo-intersection number p is the smallest among such cardinal characteristics, it suffices to show that PFA(T * ) implies that p > ω 1 . But it is well-known that p > ω 1 is equivalent to the forcing axiom MA ω1 (σ-centered) (see, for example, [13 It is a natural question whether the property of being Knaster is equivalent to being stationarily Knaster. We first observe that under MA ω1 , the answer is yes. Proof. Recall that under MA ω1 , every ω 1 -c.c. forcing poset of size ω 1 is σ-centered. Let P be ω 1 -c.c. If P is countable, then it is trivial to see that it is stationarily Knaster, so assume that P is uncountable.
Let {p i : i ∈ S} be a collection of conditions in P, where S ⊆ ω 1 is stationary. Fix a regular cardinal θ with P ∈ H(θ). Let N be an elementary substructure of (H(θ), ∈, P, {p i : i ∈ S}) of size ω 1 .
Let P 0 := N ∩ P. Observe that P 0 is ω 1 -c.c. and has size ω 1 . Hence, MA ω1 implies that P 0 is σ-centered, and therefore stationarily Knaster by Lemma 4.4. Since {p i : i ∈ S} ⊆ P 0 , there exists a stationary set T ⊆ S such that {p i : i ∈ T } is linked in P 0 . But then {p i : i ∈ T } is linked in P.
The rest of this section is devoted to proving that under PFA(T * ), the forcing poset consisting of finite antichains of T * ordered by reverse inclusion is Knaster but not stationarily Knaster.
Recall the result of Baumgartner-Malitz-Reinhardt [3] that if T is a tree of height ω 1 with no uncountable chains, and x α : α < ω 1 is a pairwise disjoint sequence of finite subsets of T , then there exist α < β such that every node in x α is incomparable in T with every node in x β . This implies an apparently stronger conclusion. 2 → 2 by F (α, β) = 0 if there is a member of x α which is comparable in T with a member of x β , and F (α, β) = 1 otherwise. By the Dushnik-Miller theorem ω 1 → (ω 1 , ω) 2 , there exists either an uncountable subset of ω 1 all of whose pairs get value 0, or a countably infinite subset of ω 1 all of whose pairs get value 1. Note that the first possibility contradicts the result of Baumgartner-Malitz-Reinhardt. So the second possibility holds, which gives us the conclusion of the lemma.
The next three results show that under PFA(T * ), we can strengthen "countably infinite" in the last lemma to "uncountable".
Lemma 4.9. Let T be an ω 1 -tree. Suppose that y n : n < ω is a sequence satisfying:
(1) each y n is a finite subset of T ; (2) for all m < n, for all x ∈ y m and z ∈ y n , ht T (x) < ht T (z) and x and z are incomparable in T . Let y be a finite subset of T such that for all n < ω, every node of y n has height less than the height of every node in y. Then there exists n < ω such that every member of y n is incomparable in T with every member of y.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that the conclusion of the lemma fails. Define a function f : ω → y by letting f (n) ∈ y be some node which is above some member of y n in T . Then there is some z ∈ y such that for infinitely many n, f (n) = z. Fix m < n such that f (m) = f (n) = z. Pick z m ∈ y m and z n ∈ y n such that z m < T z and z n < T z. Since T is a tree, it follows that z m < T z n , which contradicts our assumption about y m and y n . Proof. By thinning out and relabelling if necessary, we may assume without loss of generality that for all α < β, every node of x α has height at least α and less than the height of any member of x β .
Let us say that a set N is a suitable model if it is a countable elementary substructure of H(ω 2 ) which contains T as an element. Define a forcing poset P as follows. Conditions in P are pairs (a, X) satisfying:
(1) a ⊆ ω 1 is finite; (2) for all i < j in a, every node in x i is incomparable in T with every node in x j ; (3) X is a finite ∈-chain of suitable models; (4) for all i < j in a, there is N ∈ X such that i < N ∩ ω 1 < j; (5) if N ∈ X and i ∈ a \ N , then for any set Z ⊆ ω 1 in N with i ∈ Z, there are uncountably many j ∈ Z such that every member of x i is incomparable in T with every member of x j ; (6) if N ∈ X and i ∈ a\N , then for any function f : ω 1 → ω 1 in N , f (N ∩ω 1 ) < i; (7) if a = ∅, then X = ∅ and there is some K ∈ X such that K ∩ ω 1 < min(a).
Let (b, Y ) ≤ (a, X) if a ⊆ b and X ⊆ Y . For any condition p ∈ P, we will write p = (a p , X p ).
We begin with the claim that for all p ∈ P, there are uncountably many ξ < ω 1 such that for all i ∈ a p , every member of x i is incomparable in T with every member of x ξ . If a p = ∅, then the claim holds vacuously. Otherwise fix n < ω such that |a p | = n + 1.
Let i * be the largest member of a p . By the definition of P, there exists N ∈ X such that a p \ {i * } ⊆ N and i * / ∈ N . Let Z be the set of ξ < ω 1 such that for all i ∈ a p \ {i * }, every member of x i is incomparable in T with every member of x ξ (for clarity, if n = 0 then Z = ω 1 , which is fine). Note that Z ∈ N by elementarity, and i * ∈ Z. By the definition of P, there are uncountably many ξ ∈ Z such that every member of x i * is incomparable in T with every member of x ξ , which proves the claim.
Assume for a moment that P is T * -proper. LetȦ be a P-name for the set
Then by the definition of P, it is forced that for all i < j inȦ, every node in x i is incomparable in T with every node in x j . We claim thatȦ is forced to be uncountable, which completes the proof of the theorem under the assumption that P is T * -proper. To prove this, consider a condition p ∈ P and γ < ω 1 . We will find q ≤ p so that a q \ γ = ∅. Fix a suitable model N such that p ∈ N . Then easily (a p , X p ∪ {N }) is a condition below p. Let Y be the set of ξ < ω 1 such that for all i ∈ a p , every member of x i is incomparable in T with every member of x ξ . Then Y ∈ N by elementarity, and Y is uncountable by the claim above.
Let Y ′ be the set of ξ ∈ Y which satisfy the property that for all Z ⊆ ω 1 in N with ξ ∈ Z, there are uncountably many j ∈ Z such that every member of x ξ is incomparable in T with every member of x j . We claim that Y ′ is uncountable. If not, then there exists β < ω 1 such that for all ξ ∈ Y \ β, there is Z ξ ∈ N with ξ ∈ Z ξ and δ ξ < ω 1 such that for all j ∈ Z ξ \ δ ξ , there is a member of x ξ which is comparable in T with some member of x j . Since N is countable, we can fix Z ∈ N such that there are uncountably many ξ ∈ Y \ β for which Z ξ = Z. Now we can construct by induction an increasing sequence of ordinals ξ i : i < ω 1 in Y \ β such that for all i < ω 1 , Z ξi = Z, and for all i < j < ω 1 , δ ξi ≤ ξ j . But now for all i < j, ξ j ∈ Z ξi \ δ ξi , so there is a member of x ξi which is comparable in T with a member of x ξj . Thus, the sequence x ξi : i < ω 1 is a counterexample to the result of Baumgartner-Malitz-Reinhart, which is a contradiction.
Since Y ′ is uncountable, we can fix ξ ∈ Y ′ which is larger than N ∩ ω 1 , γ, and f (N ∩ ω 1 ) for all f : ω 1 → ω 1 in N . Then by the definition of Y ′ , it is easy to check that (a p ∪ {ξ}, X p ∪ {N }) is a condition below p. This completes the proof thatȦ is forced to be uncountable.
It remains to prove that P is T * -proper. Fix a regular cardinal θ > ω 2 such that T * , T , and P are members of H(θ), and let N be a countable elementary substructure of (H(θ), ∈, T * , T, P). Let δ := N ∩ ω 1 . Consider p ∈ N ∩ P. Define q := (a p , X p ∪ {N ∩ H(ω 2 )}). Then q is a condition and q ≤ p.
We claim that q is (N, P, T * )-generic. Fix a dense set D ∈ N , x ∈ T * δ , a P-namė A ∈ N for a subset of T * , and a relation R ∈ {< T * , < − T * }. Let r ≤ q. By extending further if necessary, we may assume that r ∈ D, r decides whether or not x ∈Ȧ, and a r \ δ = ∅. If r forces that x / ∈Ȧ, then replaceȦ in what follows by the canonical P-name for T * . Thus, we may assume without loss of generality that r forces that x ∈Ȧ.
Our goal is to find t ≤ r which is below some member of N ∩ D and a node y R x such that t forces that y ∈Ȧ. Let r N := (a r ∩ N, X r ∩ N ). It is easy to check that r N is in N ∩ P and r ≤ r N . Let B 0 denote the set of nodes z ∈ T * for which there exists a condition s ∈ D such that:
(1) s ≤ r N ; (2) a s ∩ ht T * (z) = a r ∩ δ; (3) s forces that z ∈Ȧ. Observe that B 0 ∈ N by elementarity, and x ∈ B 0 as witnessed by r.
For each z ∈ B 0 , let B 0 (z) denote the set of conditions s ∈ D which witness that z ∈ B 0 . The function z → B 0 (z) is in N by elementarity, and r ∈ B 0 (x). Define a function F : B 0 → ω 1 + 1 by
Note that F ∈ N by elementarity. Define
Then X and H are in N by elementarity.
Property (6) in the definition of r being a condition implies that H(δ) < min(a r \ δ). In particular, x cannot be in X. For otherwise F (x) would be in the set for which H(δ) is the supremum, which implies that min(a r \ δ) ≤ F (x) ≤ H(δ), giving a contradiction. Therefore, F (x) = ω 1 .
Let B 1 := {z ∈ B 0 : F (z) = ω 1 }. Then B 1 ∈ N by elementarity, and x ∈ B 1 as just proven. Since x is (N, T * )-generic, there exists y R x such that y ∈ B 1 . Let δ 0 := ht T * (y). Since F and y are in N and F (y) = ω 1 , it is straightforward to construct in N a sequence s i : i < ω 1 of conditions in B 0 (y) such that for all i < j < ω 1 , max(a si ) < min(a sj \ δ 0 ).
For each i < ω 1 , let y i := {x α : α ∈ a si \ δ 0 }. Then y i : i < ω 1 is a pairwise disjoint sequence of finite subsets of T . Note that for all i < j, every node in y i has height in T less than the height of every node in y j . Apply Lemma 4.8 inside N to find a set z ⊆ ω 1 in N with order type ω such that for all i < j in z, every member of y i is incomparable in T with every member of y j . Define y := {x i : i ∈ a r \ δ}. Note that since z ∈ N , for all i ∈ z, every node in y i has height less than δ, whereas every node in y has height at least δ. So we can apply Lemma 4.9 to y i : i ∈ z and y to find β ∈ z such that every node in y β is incomparable in T with every node in y.
Let s := s β . We claim that r and s are compatible. Define t := (a r ∪a s , X r ∪X s ). We will show that t is in P. Then clearly t ≤ r, s. It is easy to check that t satisfies all of the properties of being in P except possibly (2) .
Consider i < j in a t , and we will prove that every node in x i is incomparable in T with every node in x j . If i and j are either both in a r or both in a s , then the desired conclusion is true since r and s are conditions. Otherwise i ∈ a s \ a r and j ∈ a r \ a s . Since s ∈ B 0 (y), a s ∩ δ 0 = a r ∩ δ. Thus, i ∈ a s \ δ 0 and j ∈ a r \ δ. So x i ⊆ y β and x j ⊆ y. By the choice of β, every node of x i is incomparable in T with every node of x j .
So we have that t ∈ P and t ≤ r, s. In particular, t is below a member of N ∩ D, namely s. Also y R x and s forces that y ∈Ȧ. So t ≤ r and t forces that y ∈Ȧ, which completes the proof that q is (N, P, T * )-generic.
Corollary 4.11. Assume PFA(T * ). Let T be a tree of height ω 1 with no uncountable chains, and let x α : α < ω 1 be a pairwise disjoint sequence of finite subsets of T . Then there exists an uncountable set A ⊆ ω 1 such that for all α < β in A, every member of x α is incomparable in T with every member of x β .
Proof. Let P be the T * -proper forcing from Theorem 4.10, and letȦ be a P-name for an uncountable subset of ω 1 such that for all α < β inȦ, every member of x α is incomparable in T with every member of x β . For each α < ω 1 , let D α be the dense set of conditions in P which decide the α-th member ofȦ. Let G be a filter on P which meets each dense set D α . For each α, let γ α be the unique ordinal such that for some p ∈ D α ∩ G, p forces that γ α is the α-th member ofȦ. By the fact that G is a filter, it is easy to check that for all α < β, every member of x γα is incomparable in T with every member of x γ β .
If we ignore T * , then Theorem 4.10 shows more generally that there exists a proper forcing which adds a set A as described in the theorem. Consequently, the conclusion of Corollary 4.11 follows from PFA. Proof. Let T be an ω 1 -tree. For each α < ω 1 , choose a node t α of T with height α, and define x α := {t α }. Apply Corollary 4.11 to the collection {x α : α < ω 1 } to find an uncountable set A ⊆ ω 1 so that for all α < β in A, t α and t β are incomparable in T . Then {t α : α ∈ A} is an uncountable antichain of T . So T is not an ω 1 -Suslin tree.
Theorem 4.13. Assume PFA(T * ). Let P be the forcing poset whose conditions are finite antichains of T * , ordered by reverse inclusion. Then P is Knaster but not stationarily Knaster.
Proof. Note that conditions x and y of P are compatible iff x ∪ y is an antichain of T * . For each α < ω 1 , pick an element t α of T * with height α, and let p α := {t α }. Then p α and p β are compatible in P iff t α and t β are incomparable in T * . If S ⊆ ω 1 , then {p α : α ∈ S} is a linked subset of P iff for all α < β in S, t α and t β are incomparable in T * iff {t α : α ∈ S} is an antichain of T * . Since T * has no stationary antichains, if S is stationary then {p α : α ∈ S} is not linked. It follows that P is not stationarily Knaster.
To see that P is Knaster assuming PFA(T * ), let {q α : α < ω 1 } be a family of conditions in P. By the ∆-system lemma, we may assume without loss of generality that there is a finite set r ⊆ T * such that for all α < β < ω 1 , q α ∩ q β = r. Let x α := q α \ r for all α < ω 1 . Then x α : α < ω 1 is a pairwise disjoint sequence of finite subsets of T * . By Corollary 4.11, there exists an uncountable set A ⊆ ω 1 such that for all α < β in A, every member of x α is incomparable in T with every member of x β . It immediately follows that for all α < β in A, q α ∪ q β is an antichain of T * , and hence a condition below q α and q β .
Digression: more on stationarily Knaster
In the previous section we proved that under PFA(T * ), there exists a forcing poset which is Knaster but not stationarily Knaster. We now prove that the same conclusion follows from ♦ * . Afterwards, we introduce and explore the property of having stationary precaliber ω 1 .
Recall that ♦ * is the statement that there exists a sequence S α : α < ω 1 satisfying:
(1) each S α is a collection of countably many subsets of α; (2) for all X ⊆ ω 1 , there exists a club D ⊆ ω 1 such that for all α ∈ D, X ∩ α ∈ S α . Proof. Fix a sequence F α : α < ω 1 satisfying:
(1) each F α is a collection of countably many functions from α to ω; (2) for any function F :
Standard arguments show that ♦ * implies the existence of such a sequence. For each limit ordinal α < ω 1 , fix a cofinal subset L α of α with order type ω. Let α < ω 1 be a limit ordinal, and consider the countable collection of functions {f ↾ L α : f ∈ F α }. An easy diagonalization argument shows that there exists a function g α : L α → ω satisfying that for all f ∈ F α , there exists γ < α such that for all β ∈ L α \ γ, f (β) < g α (β). In particular, for all f ∈ F α , g α = f ↾ L α .
We now consider the forcing poset from [4] for adding a uniformisation of the colored ladder system (L α , g α ) : α ∈ lim(ω 1 ) . Let P be the forcing poset whose conditions are pairs (x, h) satisfying:
We claim that P is Knaster but not stationarily Knaster. To see that it is Knaster, we argue in a similar way as in [4] . Suppose that (x i , h i ) : i < ω 1 is a sequence of conditions in P. Applying the ∆-system lemma and a standard thinning out argument, we can find an uncountable set Z ⊆ ω 1 such that for some set r, for all i < j in Z, x i ∩ x j = r and max(x i ) < min(x j \ r). By relabeling the sequence if necessary, we may assume without loss of generality that Z = ω 1 .
For each i < ω 1 , choose a sequence γ i α : α ∈ r such that for each α ∈ r, γ i α < α and for all β ∈ L α \ γ i α , h i (β) = g α (β). By a pressing-down argument, we can find Y 1 ⊆ ω 1 stationary so that for all i < j in Y 1 :
Observe that (1) and (2) imply that for all i < j in
is a lower bound of (x i + , h i + ) and (x j + , h j + ). This completes the proof that P is Knaster.
Now we prove that P is not stationarily Knaster. For each limit ordinal α < ω 1 , define p α := ({α}, g α ). Then obviously p α ∈ P. Suppose for a contradiction that there exists a stationary set T ⊆ lim(ω 1 ) such that for all i < j in T , p i and p j are compatible. Then for all i < j in T , ({i, j}, g i ∪ g j ) ∈ P, and in particular,
Define a function F : ω 1 → ω so that for all γ < ω 1 , F (γ) = g i (γ) if i ∈ T and γ ∈ L i , and if there is no such i, then F (γ) = 0. By the choice of T , F is well-defined. By the choice of the sequence F α : α ∈ lim(ω 1 ) , there exists a club D ⊆ ω 1 such that for all α ∈ D, F ↾ α ∈ F α . Since T is stationary, we can fix
But this contradicts the choice of g α .
Recall that a forcing poset P has precaliber ω 1 if whenever X ⊆ P is uncountable, then there exists an uncountable set Y ⊆ X which is centered. With the difference between Knaster and stationarily Knaster in mind, we introduce the following variation of this idea. On the other hand, it is consistent that there exists a forcing poset which is stationarily Knaster but does not have stationary precaliber ω 1 . Proof. By [13, Theorem 1.3] , there exists a forcing poset of size t which is σ-linked but has no centered subsets of size t. Assuming t = ω 1 , it follows that there exists a forcing poset P of size ω 1 which is σ-linked but has no centered subsets of size ω 1 .
Since P is σ-linked, P is stationarily Knaster by Lemma 4.4. Fix a sequence p i : i < ω 1 of distinct conditions in P. Then for any stationary set T ⊆ ω 1 , {p i : i ∈ T } is not centered, since P contains no centered subsets of size ω 1 . Thus, P does not have stationary precaliber ω 1 .
Since ♦ * implies CH, the following corollary is immediate from the previous results. 
P -ideal dichotomy
In this section we will prove that PFA(T * ) implies the P -ideal dichotomy. This will allow us to draw strong consequences from PFA(T * ), such as the failure of square principles.
We recall the relevant definitions.
Definition 6.1. Let S be an uncountable set and I an ideal who members are countable subsets of S and which contains all finite subsets of S. We say that I is a P -ideal over S if whenever {A n : n < ω} ⊆ I, then there is B ∈ I such that for all n < ω, A n ⊆ * B.
Definition 6.2. The P -ideal dichotomy is the statement that whenever I is a Pideal over an uncountable set S, then either there exists an uncountable set T ⊆ S such that [T ] ω ⊆ I, or S = {S n : n < ω}, where for each n < ω, [S n ] ω ∩ I = ∅.
Fix a P -ideal I over an uncountable set S, and we will prove that under PFA(T * ), one of the two alternatives of the P -ideal dichotomy holds for I. For a set X ⊆ S, we will write X ⊥ I to mean that [X] ω ∩ I = ∅. Note that for any finite set x ⊆ S, x ⊥ I. If S is equal to a union {S n : n < ω}, where for each n, S n ⊥ I, then we are done. So assume not.
We will prove that there exists a T * -proper forcing poset which adds an uncountable set T ⊆ S such that [T ] ω ⊆ I. There are several proper forcing posets in the literature for adding such a set. We will prove that the version from [1] is T * -proper. For completeness, we include all of the details from [1] for showing that this forcing is proper.
Recall that a set K ⊆ I is cofinal if for all x ∈ I, there is y ∈ K such that x ⊆ * y. For a cofinal set K ⊆ I and a ∈ I, define K ↾ a := {b ∈ K : a ⊆ b}. For any condition p ∈ P, we will write p = (a p , X p ).
Observe that if p ∈ P and K ⊆ I is cofinal, then (a p , X p ∪ {K}) is a condition below p.
The next two lemmas will help us to prove that P adds an uncountable subset of S all of whose countable subsets are in I.
Lemma 6.4. Let p ∈ P. For any countable set S 0 ⊆ S, there is q ≤ p such that a q \ S 0 = ∅.
Proof. For any x ∈ S, it is easy to see that there exists q ≤ p with x ∈ a q iff for all K ∈ X p , the set {a ∈ K : x ∈ a} is cofinal in I. For example, if the latter holds, then
is such a condition. So if the lemma fails, then for each x ∈ S \ S 0 , there exists K x ∈ X p and a x ∈ I such that a x \ d is infinite whenever d ∈ K x and x ∈ d. Now consider the partition of S into countably many sets which includes all of the singletons of elements of S 0 together with
Recalling that S cannot be written as the union of countably many sets each of which has all of its countably infinite subsets not in I, we will get a contradiction if we can show that for each
ω , and we will prove that b / ∈ I. Suppose for a contradiction that b ∈ I. Since I is a P -ideal, fix a set c ∈ I such that b ⊆ * c and for all x ∈ b, a x ⊆ * c.
Lemma 6.5. Suppose that p ∈ P, z ∈ S, and p forces that z ∈ a s for some s ∈Ġ P . Then z ∈ a p .
Proof. Suppose that z / ∈ a p , and we will show that p does not force that z ∈ a s for some s ∈Ġ P . Define K := {a \ {z} : a ∈ I}. Then clearly K is cofinal, and every member of K does not contain z. Define q := (a p , X p ∪ {K}). Then q ≤ p. We claim that q forces that z / ∈ a s for all s ∈Ġ P . Otherwise we can find r ≤ q such that z ∈ a r . Then z ∈ a r \ a q . Since K ∈ X q , K ↾ (a r \ a q ) is in X r , and in particular is cofinal and hence non-empty. Fix b ∈ K ↾ (a r \ a q ). Then b ∈ K and z ∈ b. But this contradicts that every member of K does not contain z.
We will prove below that the forcing poset P is T * -proper and countably distributive. Assume for a moment that this is true. Observe that since P is countably distributive, P is still a P -ideal over S in V P . LetṪ be a P-name for the set
We claim that P forces thatṪ is uncountable and [Ṫ ] ω ⊆ I. Suppose for a contradiction that some condition forces thatṪ is countable. Then since P is countably distributive, there exists a countable set S 0 ⊆ S and a condition p such that p forces that S 0 =Ṫ . But by Lemma 6.4, we can find q ≤ p such that a q \ S 0 = ∅. Then q forces thatṪ is not a subset of S 0 , which is a contradiction. Now assume that p ∈ P and p forces thatẋ ∈ [Ṫ ] ω . Since P is countably distributive, there is x ∈ [S] ω and q ≤ p such that q forces that x =ẋ. Then for all z ∈ x, q forces that z ∈ẋ ⊆Ṫ , so by definition, q forces that z ∈ a s for some s ∈Ġ P . By Lemma 6.5, z ∈ a q . So x ⊆ a q . But a q ∈ I, so x ∈ I. Thus, q forces thatẋ ∈ I.
The next two lemmas, which appear in [1] , will be used to show that P is proper.
d ⊆ N , a t \ a p is a finite subset of N and hence is a member of N . By elementarity, there exists q ∈ N ∩ P such that q ≤ p, a q \ a p = a t \ a p , and q forces that y ∈Ȧ.
Then a q \ a p ⊆ d. So q witnesses that (1) holds, which is a contradiction. It remains to show that (a p , X p ∪{J}) forces that y ∈Ȧ. If not, then there exists q ≤ (a p , X p ∪ {J}) which forces that y ∈Ȧ. By the definition of the order on P, J ↾ (a q \ a p ) is in X q , and therefore is cofinal and hence non-empty. Fix a ∈ J such that a q \ a p ⊆ a. Then q ≤ p, a q \ a p ⊆ a, and q forces that y ∈Ȧ, contradicting the fact that a ∈ J.
Lemma 6.9. Let θ be a regular cardinal such that S, I, and P are members of H(θ), and N a countable elementary substructure of (H(θ), ∈, S, I, P). Let δ := N ∩ ω 1 . Assume that d ∈ I satisfies that d ⊆ N and for all a ∈ N ∩ I, a ⊆ * d. Suppose that x ∈ T * δ ,Ȧ ∈ N is a P-name for a subset of T * , R ∈ {< T * , < − T * }, and p ∈ N ∩ P. Then either:
(1) there exists y R x and q ≤ p in N ∩ P such that a q \ a p ⊆ d and q forces that y ∈Ȧ, or (2) there exists a cofinal set J ⊆ I such that (a p , X p ∪ {J}) forces that x / ∈Ȧ.
Proof. If (1) fails, then by Lemma 6.8 we have that for all y R x, there exists a cofinal set J ⊆ I such that (a p , X p ∪ {J}) forces that y / ∈Ȧ. Let B be the set of z ∈ T * for which there exists a cofinal set J ⊆ I such that (a p , X p ∪ {J}) forces that z / ∈Ȧ. Then B ∈ N by elementarity, and for all y R x, y ∈ B. By Lemma 1.4, it follows that x ∈ B. So there exists a cofinal set J ⊆ I such that (a p , X p ∪ {J}) forces that x / ∈Ȧ.
Proposition 6.10. The forcing poset P is T * -proper and countably distributive.
Proof. Fix a regular cardinal θ such that T * , S, I, and P are members of H(θ). Let N be a countable elementary substructure of H(θ) which contains these parameters. Let δ := N ∩ω 1 . Consider p ∈ N ∩P. We will find q ≤ p which is (N, P, T * )-generic. In fact, q will have the property that it is a member of every dense open subset of P which lies in N . Standard arguments show that this implies that P is countably distributive.
Since I is a P -ideal and N is countable, we can fix a set d ∈ I such that for all a ∈ N ∩ I, a ⊆ * d. By intersecting d with N if necessary, we may also assume that d ⊆ N . Let D n : n < ω enumerate all dense open subsets of P in N . Let (x n ,Ȧ n ) : n < ω list all pairs (x,Ȧ), where x ∈ T * δ andȦ ∈ N is a P-name for a subset of T * . Let (i n , K n ) : n < ω enumerate all pairs (i, K) such that i < ω and K is a cofinal subset of I in N .
We will define by induction on n < ω objects p n , d n , and a function F whose domain is a subset of ω. For bookkeeping, fix a surjection f : ω → 3 × ω such that for each (i, m) ∈ 3 × ω, f −1 ({i, m}) is infinite. We will maintain the following properties:
(1) p 0 = p and d 0 = d; (2) for all n < ω, p n ∈ N ∩ P and p n+1 ≤ p n ; (3) for all n < ω, d n ∈ I, for all a ∈ N ∩ I, a ⊆ * d n , and d n+1 ⊆ d n ; (4) for all n < ω, a pn+1 \ a pn ⊆ d n+1 . − T * . This completes the construction. Let X := {X pn : n < ω}. Define q = (a q , X q ) by a q := {a pn : n < ω} and
We claim that q is a condition below each p n .
Observe that by construction, for all n < ω, a q \ a pn ⊆ d n+1 . In particular, a q = a p0 ∪ (a q \ a p0 ) ⊆ a p0 ∪ d 1 , which implies that a q is in I.
Clearly X is a countable collection of cofinal subsets of I. Consider i < ω and K ∈ X pi , and we will show that
is cofinal in I. But we claim that K ↾ (a q \ a pi ) contains this cofinal set, and hence is itself cofinal. To see this, assume that a ∈ K m contains a pn \ a pi m and d n+1 . Then a ∈ K m = K. We need to show that a q \ a pi ⊆ a. Since a pi ⊆ a pn ⊆ a q , we have that a q \ a pi = (a q \ a pn ) ∪ (a pn \ a pi ).
And both of the sets in this union are subsets of a, by the choice of a and since a q \ a pn ⊆ d n+1 .
Thus, q is a condition, and easily by definition, q ≤ p n for all n < ω. By construction, for any dense open subset D of P in N , q ∈ D. So q is (N, P)-generic.
In order to find an (N, P, T * )-generic condition, we need to extend q further. But before we do this, let us prove a claim. Consider n ∈ dom(F ) such that F (n) ⊆ I is cofinal. We claim that F := F (n) ↾ (a q \ a pn ) is cofinal. Note that by construction, we are in the case that f (n) = (i, m), where i ∈ {1, 2}, (a pn , X pn ∪ {F (n)}) forces that x m / ∈Ȧ m , and F (n) ↾ d n+1 is cofinal. But since a q \ a pn ⊆ d n+1 , we have that
Thus, F contains a cofinal set, and hence is itself cofinal. Define X 1 := {F (n) : n ∈ dom(F ), F (n) ⊆ I is cofinal} and X 2 := {F (n) ↾ (a q \ a pn ) : n ∈ dom(F ), F (n) ⊆ I is cofinal}. Note that by the claim of the previous paragraph, every member of X 2 is cofinal. Define r := (a q , X q ∪ X 1 ∪ X 2 ). Then clearly r ∈ P and r ≤ q. In particular, r is (N, P)-generic.
It remains to show that r is (N, P, T * )-generic. So let x ∈ T * δ ,Ȧ ∈ N a P-name for a subset of T * , and R ∈ {< T * , < − T * }. Let i be 1 if R equals < T * and 2 if R equals < − T * . Fix m such that (x m ,Ȧ m ) = (x,Ȧ). Fix n < ω such that f (n) = (i, m).
Recall that at stage n we considered two possibilities. The first is that there exists y R x m and v ≤ p n in N ∩ P such that v forces that y ∈Ȧ m and a v \ a pn ⊆ d n . In that case, F (n) R x m and p n+1 forces that F (n) ∈Ȧ m . Thus, F (n) R x and r forces that F (n) ∈Ȧ, and we are done.
The second possibility is that there exists a cofinal set, which we defined as F (n), such that (a pn , X pn ∪ {F (n)}) forces that x m / ∈Ȧ m . By the definition of r, F (n) ∈ X r and F (n) ↾ (a r \ a pn ) = F (n) ↾ (a q \ a pn ) ∈ X r . It follows that r ≤ (a pn , X pn ∪ {F (n)}). Thus, r forces that x / ∈Ȧ, which concludes the proof.
Theorem 6.11. PFA(T * ) implies the P -ideal dichotomy.
Proof. Let I be a P -ideal over an uncountable set S, and assume that the second alternative of Definition 6.2 fails. Let P be the T * -proper, countably distributive forcing poset from Definition 6.3. Then there exists a P-nameṪ for an uncountable subset of S all of whose countable subsets are members of I. Fix a P-nameḟ for an injection of ω 1 intoṪ .
Since P is countably distributive, for each γ < ω 1 the set of p ∈ P which decidė f ↾ γ is dense. By PFA(T * ), let G be a filter on P which meets each such dense set. For all i < ω 1 , let z i ∈ S be such that for some p ∈ G, p forces thatḟ (i) = z i . Let Z := {z i : i < ω 1 }, which is an uncountable subset of S. Note that for all γ < ω 1 , there is p ∈ G which forces that {z i : i < γ} =ḟ [γ] ∈ I, and hence {z i : i < γ} ∈ I.
But if X ∈ [Z]
ω , then for some γ < ω 1 , X ⊆ {z i : i < γ}, and so X ∈ I.
Corollary 6.12. PFA(T * ) implies that for all regular cardinals λ > ω 1 , (λ) fails. In particular, it implies that for all cardinals κ ≥ ω 1 , κ fails. Corollary 6.14. PFA(T * ) implies that for all regular uncountable cardinals κ and λ, if there exists a (κ, λ * )-gap in P (ω), then κ = λ = ω 1 .
These statements are immediate, since the conclusions of the corollaries are consequences of the P -ideal dichotomy ( [12] , [14] ).
It is well-known that the P -ideal dichotomy combined with p > ω 1 has many consequences which do not follow from the P -ideal dichotomy alone. Since PFA(T * ) implies p > ω 1 by Corollary 4.6, we can derive additional conclusions. We mention two important examples (see [11] ).
Corollary 6.15. PFA(T * ) implies that for all α < ω 1 , ω 1 → (ω 1 , α) 2 .
Corollary 6.16. PFA(T * ) implies the non-existence of S-spaces.
Observe that our results prove that the P -ideal dichotomy together with p > ω 1 does not imply that all ω 1 -Aronszajn trees are special (or even that all ω 1 -Aronszajn trees have a stationary antichain). A similar but more restrictive result was proven earlier in [5] , where it was shown that an ideal dichotomy for ω 1 -generated ideals together with p > ω 1 is consistent with a non-special Aronszajn tree.
We close the paper with some topics for future research. We currently do not know whether some other notable consequences of PFA not addressed in this paper follow from PFA(T * ). These include the open coloring axiom, the mapping reflection principle, measuring, and the non-existence of weak Kurepa trees.
An important part of Todorcevic's theory of PFA(S) is the model PFA(S)[S], which is obtained by forcing over a model of PFA(S) with the coherent Suslin tree S. In contrast, PFA(T * ) implies that every ω 1 -Aronszajn tree is special on cofinally many levels (see the argument from [7, Lemma 4.6, Chapter IX]). It follows that forcing with T * collapses ω 1 . We do not know, however, whether generic extensions of models of PFA(T * ) by other forcings associated with T * could be interesting, such as the forcing for specializing T * with finite appoximations. The theory of PFA(T * ) could possibly be relevant to the issues of chain conditions and Martin's axiom which motivated PFA(S). For example, it is open whether Martin's axiom follows from the statement that all ω 1 -c.c. forcings are Knaster, or from the statement that the product of ω 1 -c.c. forcings is ω 1 -c.c.
